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Female Electability in the Arab World:

The Advantages of Intersectionality

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How do voters evaluate female candidates with multiple, intersecting identities? Can women leverage other social identities to succeed at the ballot box? Given the rise in women running for office as a result of electoral gender quotas, this question is timely. Yet, we know little about why certain women are more likely to be successful across different contexts. Existing literature on voting behavior focuses on single identities, including gender,¹ race and ethnicity,² religion,³ and party,⁴ and shows how candidates' identities shape electability in Western democracies.⁵ However, rarely does electoral politics literature empirically consider how intersections between gender and other social identities shape candidates' chances at the polls, especially in the developing world.⁶

Voters weigh multiple factors when selecting candidates and sometimes make difficult choices between the identities they desire and others they find less appealing or outright oppose. This is particularly true in low information settings, where voters rely on informational shortcuts to evaluate candidates.⁷ In Jordan, a semi-competitive electoral context like many other developing countries, several politically salient candidate identities send signals to voters. When multiple candidate identities are simultaneously at play, voter choice may not be simple. For instance, voters may dislike female candidates but believe in a given election that a woman would better represent them than male candidates from a different tribe⁸ or ideological background. Or, voters may support opposition candidates, but see a member of their tribe as better placed to provide them access to public services.

Applied to electoral politics, intersectionality considers how multiple candidate identities, as well as a society's social hierarchies, influence voter behavior. While it has

been central to women and politics research,⁹ particularly in the West, and though it figures prominently in identity politics literature, intersectionality has yet to enter mainstream electoral behavior theory. Although some work on voting for Islamists has focused on female candidates and voters,¹⁰ work on how Islamist female candidates are perceived is rare. Even work that considers multiple identities¹¹ does not fully engage an intersectional approach, which sees identities as mutually constituted by social hierarchies, leading to complex and often unexpected effects.¹²

To fill this gap, we argue and empirically demonstrate that existing theories of electoral behavior—gender role congruity, power relations, and social identity theories—cannot fully account for women’s electoral marginalization and, in some cases, women’s relative advantage vis-à-vis men from the same identity groups. We find that an intersectional framework, which considers how social hierarchies create complex effects on electability, is needed in non-democratic settings as much as it is in democracies. Gender identity is the avenue through which we make our case, but we believe that intersectionality should be more broadly employed as an approach in empirical studies of candidate electability across political contexts.

Intersectionality theory posits that identities are mutually constitutive of power structures and that when an individual belongs to two or more identity groups, each elemental identity is inextricably linked to the other in complex ways that are not easily reducible to an additive function of group categories such as gender, ethnicity, or ideology.¹³ For instance, women from an ethnic minority encounter a different social environment than do other women, and also experience being an ethnic minority differently than the men of their minority group.¹⁴ In Jordan, this means that social identities like gender, tribe, or religious ideology “operate not as unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but as reciprocally constructing phenomena that in turn shape complex social inequalities.”¹⁵ With few exceptions,¹⁶ intersectionality lacks empirical testing in electoral studies, particularly when considering voting behavior in non-western contexts.

We explore the interactive effects of multiple candidate identities (i.e., gender, tribal identity, and Islamism) on voter preferences, bringing intersectionality theory into conversation with other theories that have been employed to explain voter behavior. We evaluate the usefulness of theories of in-group bias including social identity theory and cross-cutting cleavages and theories of gender and social hierarchy, as well as gender role congruity and power relations theory. We use an original survey experiment conducted among 1,499 Jordanians in 2014 in which respondents were randomly assigned to hear one of six statements about: (1a) a male candidate who is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm and the country’s dominant Islamist group, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) or (1b) a female member of the IAF; (2a) a male candidate who is a member of the respondent’s tribe or (2b) a female candidate who is a member of the respondent’s tribe; or (3a) a male candidate with no other information or (3b) a female candidate with no other information. Respondents heard the interviewer read a total of two statements at random and evaluated how likely they would be to vote for each candidate. This allows us to examine the impact of candidate gender alone and

interacted with shared tribal identity and candidate Islamist ideology on electability across different voter groups.¹⁷

We show how existing theories inform our understanding of women's electability across multiple identities but are inadequate without an intersectional approach to explain our empirical findings. Gender role congruity theory posits that women will be less electable than men, overall, because they lack the stereotyped personality traits associated with good leadership,¹⁸ while power relations theory argues that women and members of other marginalized groups like the political opposition will be stereotyped as having less power¹⁹ and thus will be less electable because they will be seen as less able to access resources for service provision.²⁰ Social identity theory postulates that voters prefer members of their social in-groups, such as co-tribalists and co-religionists;²¹ the cross-cutting cleavages argument builds on in-group bias theory by suggesting that in-group favoritism along one identity cleavage will be dampened by that of an opposing identity cleavage.²²

Yet, women's electability cannot fully be explained by these theories across all voter groups. Consistent with gender role congruity and power relations theory, we find that candidates who are generally stereotyped as having the traits and competencies desired in a political leader—i.e., male candidates—are more electable than candidates from groups who are marginalized from power—i.e., women and Islamists. As predicted by social identity theory, co-tribalists and Islamists are more likely to support members of their in-groups.

Consistent with an intersectional framework,²³ female candidates' chances at the polls are shaped by their other identities in complex ways that are impacted by existing power structures. As a result, women can improve their chances relative to men from their group by leveraging an intersecting trait, such as shared tribal identity or Islamism. Female tribal members are as electable as male tribal members. Islamists are least electable overall, but female Islamists are as likely to be elected as male Islamists. Thus, our findings show that intersecting identities shape electability in ways that are not expected by existing theories because, apart from cross-cutting cleavages theory, they have been developed to consider traits in isolation from one another and, apart from gender role congruity and power relations theories, do not take power hierarchies across groups into account.

This research also challenges the conventional wisdom that Islamists (typically more religious citizens)²⁴ and tribalists (more conservative citizens) shun women in politics.²⁵ According to a theory of cross-cutting cleavages, Islamist and tribalist voters should experience "contradictory and opposing influences"²⁶ when faced with female Islamist and co-tribalist candidates (i.e., someone from their tribe), depressing support for these candidates. We find no such effect, which highlights the limitations of cross-cutting cleavages theory in some settings. Our findings offer insights for activists working to promote women's equality in non-western settings and speak globally to concerns about why women from different groups face disadvantages.

Explaining Women's Electability: The Need for an Intersectional Approach

Several theories explain electoral discrimination faced by women and other groups. We argue that while each theory contributes to explaining electoral politics and that not all inequalities are intersectional, there is a need for allowing inequalities to be intersectional and for empirical investigation of them in electoral studies beyond the West. Intersectionality is important for understanding electability in competitive authoritarian regimes like Jordan, where social and electoral institutions are designed to privilege some groups, as well as in other societies where structural inequality tilts the playing field.

Explaining Electability of Marginalized Groups: Gender Role Congruity and Power Relations Theory

Gender role congruity theory and power relations theory emphasize a single identity marker (i.e., gender) and predict that women will be less popular than men. As such, they explicitly consider how power hierarchies impact women's chances, but do not take multiple identities into account. Gender role congruity theory argues that due to sex segregation in the labor force, women are perceived as lacking traits associated with past leaders, who are most often men. While women are seen as capable in domestic arenas and, in fact, are often viewed as superior to men with regard to honesty and kindness, they are not seen as having traits associated with effective leadership.²⁷ Men are seen as more ambitious, forceful, and independent and thus as better leaders.²⁸ Empirical evidence supports gender role congruity theory, but does not fully consider heterogeneity across women, even though women from some groups are more likely to have been leaders than others.

Like gender role congruity theory, power relations theory posits that women will be less electable than men, but that men are more successful because they are stereotyped as having more status than women due to their structurally dominant position in society and the workforce. These perceptions stem from—and are reinforced by—gender-based behavioral differences arising from socialization; men may control topics and interrupt to exert their status, while women build consensus and adapt to interlocutors.²⁹

Power relations theory has been applied to gender, but it can also be used to consider how other marginalized identities fare electorally. Applied to electoral politics, power relations theory predicts that socio-economically advantaged groups are more likely to be seen as able to attract resources to provide services in clientelistic settings, like Jordan. This affects how women and opposition candidates are perceived since fewer women and opposition members are in positions of power and therefore are viewed as less connected to the regime's resources. In most Arab countries, like Jordan, Islamists are marginalized by electoral laws designed to favor regime incumbents over opposition parties. Given that politics in Jordan and other developing countries largely focuses on accessing state resources for clientelism,³⁰ this targeting by the regime

affects Islamists' perceived ability to tap into government funds to provide services and may hinder their electability.³¹

Moreover, throughout the developing world, female candidates are excluded from clientelistic networks, which affects their service provision.³² In the Middle East, *wasta* (i.e., personal connections or use of connections to achieve something an individual wants) is often necessary to access government services. These structural cues may not be explicitly recognized by voters, but they likely shape voter perceptions. For instance, according to our survey in Jordan,³³ 38 percent of voters see male parliamentarians as more capable of providing services, compared to 11 percent who see women as better. Although the "no difference" response was the most popular option (at 48 percent), a significant proportion sees men as more capable. Additionally, the expectation that a candidate from a powerful tribe is best able to provide *wasta* is pertinent. Most of Jordan's successful parliamentary candidates since 1993 have been male members of powerful tribes. Although individual turnover is high, the same tribes often win seats in election after election.³⁴ Thus, gender role congruity theory and power relations theory have been applied to explaining gender-based biases, but can be extended to develop expectations about how tribal and Islamist candidates might fare.

Explaining Voting for In-Group Members: Social Identity Theory and Cross-Cutting Cleavages

Two theories of electoral and identity politics stemming from in-group biases are pertinent. Developed to explain group dynamics and later applied in electoral politics, social identity theory provides insight into why voters choose candidates with different religious, ethnic, or other identities, but, like cross-cutting cleavages theory, does not take into account the structural inequality across groups. Research on social identity theory shows that participants in a variety of experimental situations place themselves and others into in-groups and out-groups and tend to hold more positive stereotypes about members of their social in-group.³⁵ Applied to electoral politics, social identity theory suggests that voters favor in-group candidates.

Studies show that social identity theory has explanatory power across numerous identities, but they are usually considered in isolation of one another. This work finds that respondents hold negative attitudes towards members of their religious out-group, believing that they will violate the participant's own values.³⁶ An experiment on municipal elections argues that in-group preference for Latino candidates arises from the belief in ethnically-linked fate.³⁷ Another study finds black state legislators are more likely to respond to black constituents' letters, even those from outside their district, suggesting an intrinsic motivation to serve one's own group.³⁸ Likewise, women parliamentarians tend to advocate more for women's interests³⁹ and are more likely to provide constituency services to women than are male legislators.⁴⁰ In-group preferences are strong in Middle Eastern societies with tribal cleavages,⁴¹ and ethnic voting theories argue that voters prefer co-ethnics.⁴² A related theory of cross-cutting

cleavages argues that when citizens must choose between candidates with opposing identities, the resulting contradictory pressures lead to voter confusion, lowered turnout, and indifference.⁴³ For instance, a voter who supports conservative Islamist values may not see political leadership as a proper realm for women; when confronted with a female Islamist candidate, the cross-cutting cleavages argument would expect this voter to remain more ambivalent towards this candidate or potentially abstain from voting altogether.

Social identity and cross-cutting cleavages theories have been applied to explain voter preferences for candidates with single and multiple identities across many contexts. However, both theories fail to fully examine preferences when identities intersect in more complex and realistic ways, or how voter perceptions of candidates are shaped by social hierarchies. In formulating social identity theory, Tajfel and Turner underscore that the status of different groups in society may play a role in determining how social identities are perceived, in line with power relations theory, but they do not explicitly test this notion.⁴⁴

The Need for Intersectionality

To fully account for voter preferences, we argue that in most instances, an intersectional lens is needed. Critically, intersectionality does more than explain voters' choices when multiple identities are at play. Developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw, intersectionality provides an analytical tool for understanding the marginalization of African American women. It highlights social justice movements' tendency to focus on African American men as the prototypical target of racism or white women as the main victims of sexism, marginalizing the differential experiences of African American women.⁴⁵ Crenshaw calls for an analysis that not only considers race and gender as separate categories, but also examines how differences within the categories of race and gender create distinct power dynamics and experiences that may put minority women either within or between both categories depending on the context.⁴⁶ Applied to electoral politics, how candidates fare is not simply an additive function of their group memberships leading to double discrimination in the case of two minority identities, but is intersectional, due to the impact of power structures.⁴⁷

Unlike unitary and multiple approaches,⁴⁸ intersectionality examines simultaneous and interacting effects of gender and other categories, not as unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but rather as reciprocally constructing phenomena.⁴⁹ Intersectionality treats groups as diverse, with members who often differ in politically significant ways, and engages both an individual as well as an institutional lens. Only an intersectional approach sees each of the multiple identities as mutually constitutive with existing institutional structures and power hierarchies.

We extend existing gender role congruity, power relations, social identity, and cross-cutting cleavages theories and develop a theory of intersectional electoral politics more fully than previous work. This allows the impact of candidate sex, opposition/incumbent group, and shared tribal identity to be theorized and explained. Empirically,

Table 1 Comparing Existing Electoral Behavior Theories

<i>Theory</i>	<i>Theorizes about multiple identities?</i>	<i>Considers power structures?</i>	<i>Approach (Hancock 2007)</i>	<i>Summarized expectations</i>
Gender Role Congruity Theory	No, focuses on gender	Yes	Unitary approach	Voters will underevaluate female candidates (H1)
Power Relations Theory	No, focuses on marginalized identities in isolation	Yes	Unitary approach	Voters will underevaluate female and Islamist candidates and non-tribal members (H2)
Social Identity Theory	No, focuses on identities in isolation	No	Unitary approach	Voters prefer candidates who are members of their in-group(s) (H3)
Cross-Cutting Cleavages	Yes, considers choice between two or more identities	No	Multiple approach	Voters discount multigroup candidates with marginalized identities (H4a and H4b)
Intersectional Lens	Yes, focuses on multiple identities mutually constituted by social hierarchies	Yes	Intersectional approach	Voters factor in social hierarchies and consider multigroup candidates individually (H5a, H5b, H5c)

we employ an intercategorical, systematically comparative approach to investigate differing relationships of inequalities for electoral candidates who are members of multiple social groups.⁵⁰

Tribal Identity, Islamism, and Gender in Jordanian Elections

Tribal solidarity, Islamism, and gender are politically salient identities in Jordan. Jordan is a monarchy with a bicameral legislature, the lower house of which is popularly-elected.⁵¹ Like many competitive authoritarian and democratizing states cross-regionally, the parliament has limited policy-making power.⁵² Parliamentary candidates compete largely over access to state resources to distribute to their networks, not to shape policy.⁵³ Thus, voters expect personal benefits from parliamentarians, making candidates' perceived proximity to the regime and tribal identity an important factor in their electability.⁵⁴

76 percent of Jordanians identify with tribes, according to our survey. These social divisions⁵⁵ are reinforced through patronage and electoral institutions that increase the King's importance as the final arbitrator between competing groups.⁵⁶ Experts on

Jordanian electoral politics claim that at the polls voters must choose between a candidate they expect can access state resources and will funnel benefits towards them—e.g., a member of their tribe—and a member of the Islamist opposition, whom they may support on ideological grounds but will not expect publicly funded benefits from.⁵⁷ The electoral and patronage system thus reinforces tribal affiliation, the backbone of support for the monarchy, and dampens support for political opposition such as the Islamic Action Front (IAF).

Jordan's main Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, and its political arm, the IAF, seek to reassert Islamic values. In the past, the Muslim Brotherhood has proven itself to be an effective political power, threatening the regime's agenda in the parliament.⁵⁸ While its goal is not to overthrow the monarchy, the Brotherhood remains one of its staunchest critics.

Due to its success as an oppositional force, the regime has sought to marginalize the Brotherhood. Country experts explain how the electoral laws put Islamist strongholds at a disadvantage, prompting the IAF to boycott the 2010 and 2013 elections.⁵⁹ It suspended many of the Brotherhood's charity activities after refusing to renew its license in 2014 and closing down the movement's headquarters in 2016.

Despite being marginalized from power—or perhaps because of it—Islamist candidates are still favored by many voters. In the latest elections in 2016, the Brotherhood and its allies secured 12 percent of the seats, with other Islamists⁶⁰ taking another 7 percent.⁶¹ Moreover, the IAF currently leads one of the strongest parliamentary blocs. Accordingly, Brotherhood candidates may be favored by those who support their ideology, who could be seen as their social in-group. However, respondents might, overall, be unwilling to vote for Islamist candidates if they believe that the opposition cannot access state-funded patronage.

Candidate gender also shapes electability. As in many societies around the world, in Arab cultures, politics is a male domain, with women expected to remain in private spaces.⁶² Despite relatively high average educational attainment levels, Jordanian women have a labor force participation of 16 percent⁶³ and lack financial independence, limiting their ability to run for office. Yet, small but significant steps toward reducing women's political marginalization in Jordan have taken place in recent years, beginning with the implementation of a women's parliamentary quota in 2003. In 2016, five women also won seats outside the quota, bringing the percentage of women in parliament to the highest level (15 percent) in Jordan's history.

At the same time, Jordanians do not widely associate women with political leadership. In the most recent wave of the World Values Survey,⁶⁴ 81 percent of Jordanians agreed or strongly agreed that men make better political leaders.

Hypotheses

We develop hypotheses drawn from social identity, cross-cutting cleavages, power relations, and gender role congruity theories, which we argue are needed in tandem with

an intersectional lens to understand electoral politics. In this section, we develop a framework that can be tested in further research in order to fully distinguish the precise contribution of each mechanism.

As noted, in Jordan, most parliamentarians have been men. Thus, according to gender role congruity theory, we expect female candidates to be seen as lacking the traits associated with effective leadership and male gender roles and be less electable than male candidates in Jordan. This theory is empirically equivalent to those predicted by power relations theory in our data (H1):

H1: Across the full dataset and within subsamples of voters, female candidates will be less electable than male candidates.

Following power relations theory, we hypothesize that voters as a whole will prefer candidates who are perceived as more powerful and favored by the regime. Such candidates are those that are most likely to provide voters with access to state resources (H2). This theory can be analyzed across the full sample and across subsamples:

H2: Across the full dataset and within subsamples, candidates who are male, co-tribal members, and non-Islamist will be preferred over those who are female, not co-tribal members, and Islamist, respectively.

Social identity theory states that members of a group will favor other in-group members. As such, this theory can only be tested through analysis within subsamples of the full dataset, looking at preferences among different social identity groups towards members of in-groups compared to out-groups (H3):

H3: Within subsamples, individual voters will prefer candidates from their social in-group such that women will prefer female candidates and men will prefer male candidates; Islamists will prefer Islamist candidates, and non-Islamists will prefer non-Islamist candidates; tribal members will prefer other members of their own tribe.

Cross-cutting cleavages theory proposes that candidates with multiple identities that cut across one another will lead to less support (i.e., membership in a favored identity group and a disfavored identity group simultaneously will lead to weaker support).⁶⁵ As already noted, females are marginalized by conservative traditions like Islamism and tribal solidarity within the society. This leads to two hypotheses across the full sample and subsamples related specifically to candidates with multiple identities (H4a and H4b):

H4a: In the full sample, female Islamists and co-tribalists will fare worse than their male counterparts.

H4b: In subgroup analyses, Islamist and tribalist voters will prefer female candidates of their in-groups to a lesser extent than male candidates who share these identities. Likewise, feminist voters will be less enthusiastic about female Islamists and co-tribalists.

Adopting an Intersectional Lens

Existing theories carry expectations about how candidate identities affect their popularity in pre-determined ways. By contrast, an intersectional approach posits that the relationship between intersectional identities and electability must be empirically verified since unique identity combinations can play out in unexpected ways across contexts, shaped by structural inequality. As such there are a number of potential hypotheses that could stem from an intersectional approach, and two in particular that are most strongly motivated by insights in the existing literature.

Previous research shows that while Jordanian tribes are patrilineal, many overcame their initial opposition to running female candidates in order to gain quota seats and thus access to *wasta*.⁶⁶ This leads to the expectation that members of tribes will have an interest in favoring members of their tribe, even if those candidates are female. However, how these females will fare relative to women from other groups or men must be verified (H5a). Existing evidence from Tunisia suggests that more religious-appearing women can be as electable as more religious males, and religious women are often seen as being less conservative than religious men, so they may be able to appeal to a broader set of voters (H5b).⁶⁷ Islamist parties often are at the forefront of running female candidates because they observe religious piety through sex-segregated constituency relations⁶⁸ and are reliable voters in parliament due to high party discipline (H5c). However, neither study considers the popularity of multigroup female and male candidates vis-à-vis candidates with single identities (in this case, gender), nor do they fully theorize an intersectional lens:

H5a: Among the subsample of tribal members, gender identities will not drive significant differences in the likelihood of voting for the candidate.

H5b: In the sample as a whole, female Islamists will be preferred over male Islamists.

H5c: Among the subsample of Islamists, gender identities will not drive significant differences in the likelihood of voting for the candidate.

Survey Experiment

To explore these expectations, we employ an original low information survey experiment embedded in a household survey of 1,499 Jordanians conducted in 2014.⁶⁹ (See Appendix C.)⁷⁰ Respondents were randomly assigned two out of six potential statements about candidates. Statements were presented one at a time with a number of unrelated questions shown between them. After each statement, the respondent was asked how likely they would be to vote for the candidate. This allows us to explore electability while minimizing other social desirability biases we may be concerned about. For instance, in Jordan, some respondents will not want to admit

sexism against female candidates and would be more likely to do so if we asked them to compare such candidates side by side and choose between them. Respondents saw two candidates in total, in random order, yielding 2,850 candidate ratings.⁷¹ For instance, respondents might be asked how likely they would be to vote for “an educated woman” and “an educated man who is a member of their tribe” or vice versa. Or, they may be asked how likely they would be to vote for “an educated woman who is a member of their tribe” and “an educated man who is a member of the Islamic Action Front.” (See Appendix A, Table A1 for the full experimental design.)

We included the term “educated” in all of the statements to avoid all respondents seeing no merit at all in the candidate profiles.⁷² By doing this, and by separating the two candidates received by participants with four unrelated questions, we hoped to reduce the extent to which the study’s purpose would be obvious to respondents. To streamline the discussion of results, we drop out the description of being “educated” below since all candidate profiles carried this descriptor.⁷³ As discussed above, the experimental treatments simulate experiences that could actually occur in the real world. We follow McCall in employing an analysis of intercategory complexity, which “requires that scholars provisionally adopt existing analytical categories to document relationships of inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along multiple and conflicting dimensions.”⁷⁴

Respondent Characteristics

Due to resource constraints, we do not use a fully factorialized experimental design. Thus, we are unable to test all identity combinations. We chose to focus on the interactive effects of gender with tribal or Islamist identities. As such, we are not able to fully tease out what drives our results in this study, but our design lays the groundwork for a larger research agenda seeking to understand female electability in the Arab world and the global south more broadly. We hope to demonstrate the limitations of extant theories in accounting for electability and the need to extend these theories by engaging an intersectional approach.

We use three measures to identify respondent in-groups by their degree of gender role congruent views, Islamism, and tribal solidarity. Feminist identification is a dichotomous measure of whether the respondent supports an increase in the women’s quota in parliament or not. About one-third of the sample supports an increased quota. Although most respondents claim a tribal identity, this does not mean that all adhere to tribal solidarity—the tendency to favor one’s tribal members over others—to the same degree. We operationalize tribalist identity as favoring one’s own putative kinship group over others among those who claim tribal membership, measured by the statement: “On a scale of 1–10, how important is it that your tribe elects a parliamentary representative, where one is not at all important and ten is very important?” We dichotomized the measure so that five and below indicate non-tribalist tendencies and six and above

indicate tribalist tendencies. Among those claiming tribal membership, about one-third say that electing a tribal representative is not important; two-thirds say it is important.

To tap into respondent Islamism, we use responses to the following question: “On a scale of 1–10, please state your preference, where one means you prefer a candidate or list without any Islamist tendency and ten means you prefer a candidate or list with an Islamist tendency.” Among the sample, the split was about even between those who preferred no Islamist tendency (non-Islamists) and those who preferred an Islamist tendency (Islamists).⁷⁵

Importantly, respondent identities interact with one another in unexpected ways. About 65 percent of feminists are also tribalists, and 49 percent are Islamists; 72 percent of non-feminists are tribalists, and 56 percent are Islamists. Islamists make up 40 percent of non-tribalists and 56 percent of tribalists. This suggests that these identities are not cross-cutting in that they are not orthogonal to one another.


Results and Discussion

In this section, we follow common practice in the analysis of this type of experiment and present the marginal predicted probabilities of preferences for different candidates from binary logistic regression models, which allows for inference to the full population of Jordanian voters.⁷⁶ The outcome variable captures whether the respondent is likely to vote for the candidate (coded 6–10 on the 10-point scale) or not likely to vote for the candidate (1–5 on the scale).⁷⁷ Some may argue that an ordered logit model would be a better fit for this study rather than collapsing the data from a ten-point scale to a binary outcome, but we found that presentation of the results from an ordered logit analysis is unwieldy. The findings remain the same with the employment of other statistical models, however, including ordered logit regression and ordinary least squares regression. (For more on model specifications, see Appendices A and D.) We also run models with and without standard demographic controls, including respondent gender, age, and self-identified socio-economic status (Appendix A, Tables A2 and A3) and find similar results.

Treatment Effects across the Full Sample

We first present average treatment effects, which allow us to evaluate our expectations about the electability of candidates across the full sample of respondents. Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities of being likely to vote for the candidate based on the statistical model. (Appendix A, Table A2 presents regression tables.) In this case, predicted probabilities are standardized to range between 0 and 100 percentage points, showing on average, across all respondents in the sample the likelihood of being a supporter of the candidate (i.e., answering 6–10 on the 10-point scale), holding other factors constant. Among Jordanians in our sample, support is highest for the male candidate lacking other identifying information (71 percent probability of being likely

Figure 1 Marginal Effects of Being a Likely-Voter for the Candidate



Note: Figure 1 shows predicted probabilities (shown as solid circles) based on a logistic model of the respondent being likely to vote for the candidate with 95% confidence intervals (shown as horizontal lines).

to vote for the candidate), followed by the male co-tribalist (67 percent), female member of one’s tribe (63 percent), and the female lacking other identifying information (59 percent). The least electable candidates are the female Islamist (51 percent probability) and male Islamist (46 percent). However, it is important to keep in mind that not all of these differences are statistically significant, as we discuss below.

The results are broadly consistent with the expectations of the existing theories (H1–H4), even though none of them accounts for the complex nature of the effects at the intersection of candidate gender, tribal identity, and Islamism. Consistent with gender-based theories, gender role congruity theory, and power relations theory (H1 and H2), the male candidate lacking other identifying information is statistically significantly more desired than all other minority candidates, including the female candidate without another identity ($p < 0.001$), female tribe member ($p < 0.05$), female Islamist ($p < 0.001$), and male Islamist ($p < 0.001$). The only candidate that fares equally

well as the male without an intersecting identity is the male co-tribalist. On average, the probability of being a likely-voter for the male candidate is 13 percentage points higher than for a female candidate without other identity information. When voters are presented with male candidates, because the candidates are not noticeably different from the typical parliamentarian, they are able to pull support widely from different types of voters, as expected by gender role congruity and power relations theory (H1 and H2).

As predicted by power relations theory, Islamists of both genders do worse than all other candidates. Islamist candidates are likely seen as less proximate to the regime and are therefore less capable of helping constituents. The male Islamist is 26 percentage points behind the male candidate ($p < 0.001$) and 21 percentage points behind the male co-tribalist ($p < 0.001$); the female Islamist is 8 percentage points behind the female candidate ($p < 0.05$) and 12 percentage points behind the female co-tribalist candidate ($p < 0.05$). Across both models, and using the male Islamist candidate (the weakest candidate) as the baseline comparison, all other candidates are statistically significantly more likely to receive support ($p < 0.001$), except the female Islamist, consistent with H5b.

At the same time, we find complex and intersectional effects that are not anticipated by existing theories, including those that expect women to always face discrimination relative to men. Contrary to cross-cutting cleavages (H4a) and in ways that are not anticipated by the single-identity focus of gender role congruity (H1) and power relations (H2), females can improve their electability by leveraging an intersecting identity—shared tribal identity or Islamism—in order to be equally electable as male candidates from the same group (H5b). Even though the female tribal member is 8 percentage points less likely to receive support than the male candidate lacking another identity, she is not significantly less electable than a male tribal member. Similarly, female Islamists are not significantly less electable than male Islamists.⁷⁸

Effects across Subsamples of Respondents

To further examine the usefulness of the three theories and an intersectional approach, we test for differential effects by respondent gender, tribal solidarity, and Islamism. Since there are differential effects between two subsamples of the data, the outcomes can vary between positive and negative. The results show that, as predicted by social identity theory (H3), Islamists are significantly more likely to support Islamist candidates (see Figure 2). An Islamist respondent is 22 and 24 percentage points more likely to prefer an Islamist candidate (male and female, respectively) compared to non-Islamist respondents. However, social identity theory does not fully predict all the outcomes because it considers single identities in isolation. For instance, Islamist respondents maintain a strong preference for male candidates when other identity information is lacking. The difference between an Islamist and non-Islamist here is 17 percentage points.

Interestingly, Islamist voters are also significantly more likely to support both a female candidate who is lacking other identifying information as well as female co-


tribal candidates, compared to non-Islamists. This is consistent with H4b and existing literature which suggests that Islamist voters prefer female candidates more often than non-Islamist voters because they see female Islamists as being as likely to vote the party line and support their constituents as male Islamists. Female co-tribal candidates are likely to notice a different reception among Islamist voters versus non-Islamist ones, demonstrating how the identities of being female and co-tribal are linked in this case and combine to produce differential experiences than those for a male co-tribalist candidate, who is similarly favored among Islamist and non-Islamists (H5c). Viewed through a different intersectional lens, this finding suggests that non-Islamists subscribe to a high degree of gendered tribal solidarity, favoring male co-tribal members over other candidates who do not carry this specific identity to such an extent that they rate all other candidates as less desirable. In contrast, Islamists do not subscribe to this form of favoritism because of their Islamist parties' high party discipline. While Islamists favor all candidate types more than non-Islamists, non-Islamist voters prefer the candidate expected to be most desirable according to additive identity theories: the male co-tribal candidate.⁷⁹

These findings defy the conventional wisdom about Islamist ideology with regard to women in politics. While Islamists overall do worse than other candidates, we find that there is no difference in the electability of male and female Islamist candidates in Figure 1 (among the entire sample) or Figure 2 (among Islamist voters) in support of H5a. This is surprising given the discourse of this group that relegates women to the home,⁸⁰ though it is consistent with findings in Tunisia.⁸¹ This finding, in addition to the fact that other types of female candidates (i.e., female tribal candidates and female candidates lacking another identity) do better among Islamists compared to non-Islamists (Figure 2), also does not support conventional explanations of gender bias in the Arab world, which see the Islamic religion as a driver of bias against women.⁸² It does, however, support burgeoning work showing that gender-based bias may be more common in "secular" parties, which are oriented around male-dominated clientelistic networks, compared to Islamist parties, which tend to be more institutionalized and employ male and female parties members to reach out to constituents, often in sex-segregated environments, for the benefit of the party as a whole.⁸³

The analyses do not support cross-cutting cleavages theory, and they also contradict gender role congruity, power relations, and social identity theory among some subsamples of voters. The results demonstrate that existing theories are not adequate to explain voter preferences without an intersectional lens (see Figure 3). Social identity theory expects that co-tribal members will support co-tribal members more than non-tribal members, and they do so by 29 percentage points for both males and females. Contradicting gender role congruity and power relations theory, tribal members are just as likely to support male and female candidates lacking other identities.

Yet, that co-tribal members favor every candidate profile with the exception of the male Islamist more than non-tribalists demonstrates that none of the existing theories fully accounts for voting patterns in this case. Co-tribal members are 25 percentage points more likely to be a likely-supporter of a male candidate lacking other identifying


Figure 2 Marginal Effects of Islamist Tendency Interacted with Candidate Statement



Note: Figure 2 shows the difference in the predicted probability (shown in solid circles) of being a likely voter for a candidate among Islamist respondents compared to the baseline of non-Islamist respondents at 0 (shown as a vertical line) with 95% confidence intervals (shown as horizontal lines).

information and 23 percentage points more likely to be a likely voter of a female candidate lacking other identifying information. Tribalists are also 18 percentage points more likely to prefer a female Islamist than non-tribalists. This finding emphasizes the need to consider intersectionality when employing intercategory analyses in electoral politics as the interaction between being both a male and an Islamist is a highly disfavored combination among tribalist voters. This outcome is likely due to the threat that male Islamists specifically pose to the status quo, which in this case is a political arena dominated by males with strong tribal allegiances.⁸⁴ This also defies cross-cutting cleavage theory's expectation that female Islamists should fare worse than male Islamists. H5a, which suggests tribalists on average are just as likely to vote for male tribal as female tribal members, is consistent with Bush and Gao, who suggest that even if tribes are patriarchal and not particularly supportive of women's leadership, they can benefit from running women candidates for quota seats.⁸⁵


Figure 3 Marginal Effects of Tribalist Tendency Interacted with Candidate Statement



Note: Figure 3 shows the difference in the predicted probability (shown as solid circles) of being a likely voter for a candidate for respondents who prefer co-tribal representatives compared to the baseline of respondents who do not prefer tribal representatives at 0 (shown as a vertical line) with 95% confidence intervals (shown as horizontal lines).

An intercategorical analysis conducted on feminists versus non-feminists supports our contention that gender role congruity, power relations, and social identity theories cannot explain voter preferences across candidates with differing combinations of identities and that an intersectional framework is needed to understand some of our experimental outcomes (see Figure 4).⁸⁶ As expected by social identity theory, feminists are significantly more likely, by 15 percentage points ($p < 0.01$), to prefer female candidates who lack another identity compared to non-feminists. Power relations theory may help to explain why female co-tribal members are 16 percentage points ($p < 0.01$) more likely to be preferred by feminists compared to non-feminists. Yet, female Islamists are not statistically significantly more preferred by feminists than non-feminists, a finding that is best explained by an intersectional framework. The female Islamist does worse among feminists than other female candidates, likely due to her

Figure 4 Testing Preferences for Female Candidates among Supporters of Raising the Women’s Quota



Note: Figure 4 shows the difference in the predicted probability (shown as solid circles) of being a likely voter for a candidate for feminist respondents compared to the baseline of non-feminist respondents at 0 (shown as a vertical line) with 95% confidence intervals (shown as horizontal lines).

perceived rejection of secular feminism, although this finding may also be due to crosscutting cleavages.

Summary of Results

Voters factor in social hierarchies and consider multigroup candidates individually, demonstrating the need for an intersectional lens. We find support for gender role congruity, power relations, and social identity theories, but these three theories cannot account for the electability of all candidates among all voter groups, even considering a relatively simple intersection of three candidate traits and three voter groups. In some cases (i.e., for some candidates within specific voter groups), we find patterns in candidates’ electability that are opposite to the expectations of gender role congruity, power relations, and social identity theories. Cross-cutting cleavages theory also finds

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limited support. Our research shows that because social hierarchies shape electability, multigroup candidates may receive complex and at times unexpected reception among some voter groups. An intersectional lens allows for a more nuanced view of why women and other marginalized candidates may do better or worse in particular contexts.

Conclusion

Our results have several implications for electoral politics theories worldwide and speak to debates in the gender, tribal, and Islamist politics in the Middle East and beyond. First, our results show the need for an intersectionality theory that accounts for complex combinations of advantage and disadvantage within different social and institutional contexts.⁸⁷ Women occupy a whole new social space when they are also members of an intersecting identity group. Their electability is shaped by the complex interaction of different identities, such that women may leverage an intersecting tribal or ideological tie with voters to improve their electability and achieve parity with minority men. While our findings do not invalidate these existing theories, they demonstrate their limitations. To better comprehend voter behavior, an intersectional framework must be part of electoral behavior theory, particularly in the developing world.

Our research challenges the assumption that, when it comes to Islamist identity, women are doubly disadvantaged as an additive identity theory suggests.⁸⁸ Like Benstead, Jamal, and Lust find in Tunisia,⁸⁹ we show in Jordan that Islamist males are less electable than Islamist females. This is striking, given the patriarchal nature of Islamist ideology and the fact that transitional Tunisia is a more secular society where the Islamist Ennahda party held a plurality, while Jordan is a conservative society where Islamists are marginalized. Yet, Islamist females are able to draw at least as much support as male Islamists in both. Further research is needed to test why this is the case.

These findings complement the burgeoning literature on gender and tribal politics within comparative electoral and identity politics literature. While female candidates are disadvantaged in comparison to male candidates, they can improve their chances relative to similar men by drawing on an intersecting trait associated with their advantage, such as tribal solidarity. That tribal solidarity closes the gender gap among tribalists is again a surprising finding given tribal patriarchy. This finding illustrates the importance of conceptualizing identity as intersectional and expects identities to play in complex and unexpected ways given institutional structures.

Our work also clarifies the relationship between gender role congruity and social identity theories, which were viewed in the past as competing.⁹⁰ We argue instead that these theories are complementary, but must be extended to take into account intersecting identities and power structures (i.e., intersectionality). The extent to which respondents' desire to vote for candidates depends on those candidates' gender, tribal solidarity, and ideology, with the male candidates from dominant tribes doing best, followed by females from dominant tribes. Candidates who look most like those of the past can draw support equally from all social groups—consistently with gender role congruity

theory—while minority candidates activate stereotypes about their traits, competencies, and policy positions that lead them to lose support among some voter groups. This argument has not been articulated in the existing literature on identity politics, but is critical to our understanding of electoral politics and identity in leadership in Jordan and elsewhere. At the same time, further research is needed to understand the mechanisms behind why one intersectional identity versus another is attracting voters.

In this study, we were unable to directly test the extent to which the candidate's identity is seen as having the stereotyped psychological traits (i.e., gender role congruity theory) and competencies (i.e., power relations theory) associated with effective leadership, or how likely they are to deliver based on shared identity with the voter (i.e., social identity theory). Thus, this work is a starting point for a research agenda on intersectionality theory in electoral politics in non-western contexts. Future research should, for instance, test whether female candidates are less electable because they are seen as lacking competencies, such as providing *wasta*, or personality traits, such as decisiveness. Disentangling the role of different stereotypes will also help test whether ideology or service provision drives voters' preferences for Islamist candidates.⁹¹

Our theoretical framework is sufficiently general to explain candidate electability across a broad range of intersecting identities—such as religiosity and race—and in western and non-western contexts, though more research is needed to build a comparative framework. In this vein, Kuwait presents a case that is most similar to Jordan although numerous other Middle Eastern states also present opportunities to test Islamist versus tribalist voting tendencies including Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, as well as cases across Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Sudan and Nigeria) and South Asia (e.g., Afghanistan and Pakistan). While the extent to which political institutions marginalize the political opposition or favor some groups over others also varies, our intersectionality theory and the insights of gender role congruity, power relations, and social identity theories travel beyond any one region.

Due to resource constraints and the need for a much larger number of observations, we were unable to theorize how candidates are perceived by voters with different intersecting traits—how a female Islamist voter perceived a female non-Islamist candidate, for instance. Through a more comprehensive study designed to test questions like these and other extensions of our research, we will be better placed to understand the complex dynamics and controversies underlying voter behavior in Jordan and elsewhere.

Our work also has implications for policymakers seeking to empower women and minorities by suggesting the need for programs that are tailored to women from different backgrounds that may advantage or disadvantage candidates depending on the voter pool. At the same time, while these results offer input for women to improve their electability, these candidates will still be disadvantaged relative to males from the privileged groups. Furthermore, women from some groups (e.g., tribes) will have advantages that other women, such as non-members of a tribe or Islamists, will not have. These insights underscore the growing realization that women's chances at the polls depend not simply on their gender, but also on their intersecting identities and

highlight the need to engage intersectionality in theories of electoral behavior and policy-making.

NOTES

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70. Due to space constraints, the Appendix is not in the print version of this article. It can be viewed in the online version, at <https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp>.
71. We ran analyses on each round of the experiment separately as well as with clustered robust errors at the individual level and did not find substantive differences in the results.
72. We sought to avoid floor effects. Our experiment, like other profile-based research designs, may be viewed as violating the exclusion restriction. When the respondent hears "an educated woman/man," there are many things that change in the respondent's understanding of the candidates. We cannot manipulate gender *ceteris paribus*, due to the same social and structural mechanisms we believe explain our outcome. We are interested in the effect of gender variation and all the concomitant variation, which are randomized across our respondents.
73. We refer to this candidate as being just male or female and as a candidate lacking another identity.
74. McCall, 2005, 1773.
75. Our experiment may suffer from an underreporting of support for Islamists due to fear of admitting support for a group that opposes the monarchy. However, about half of our sample ranked the importance of having an Islamist representative between 6 and 10 on a 10-point scale suggesting that social desirability bias is minimal. Islamists in our study were no less likely to report having turned out in the 2013 elections compared to non-Islamists, despite the Islamic Action Front's boycott. Like voters in other contexts, Islamists may still engage in strategic voting when their most favored platform is not available.
76. See Clemma J. Muller and Richard F. MacLehose, "Estimating Predicted Probabilities from Logistic Regression: Different Methods Correspond to Different Target Populations," *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 43 (March 2014), 962–70.
77. Results are run using Stata's `svyset` command to account for sample stratification at the district level and clustering at the neighborhood level.
78. These results come from a low information survey experiment that did not employ a choice model. Moreover, in reality, women face all sorts of other barriers that prevent them from gaining representation in parliament, including difficulties in obtaining campaign funds and party nominations. Survey experiments are internally valid and help us to understand pure preferences, but they are not able to account for various outside influences that determine real outcomes.
79. McCall, 2015.
80. Sharabi, 1988; Alexander and Welzel, 2011.
81. Benstead, Jamal, and Lust, 2015.

82. Inglehart and Norris, 2003.
83. Mounah Abdel-Samad and Lindsay J. Benstead. "Why Do Islamist Parties Reduce the Gender Gap in Service Provision?," Paper presented at "After the Uprisings: Public Opinion, Gender, and Conflict in the Middle East" workshop, Kansas State University, May 5, 2016.
84. Lust, 2009a; Kao 2015.
85. Bush and Gao, 2015.
86. Approximately half of those who support an increase in the women's quota is male. See also Appendix D, Figure D8.
87. Crenshaw, 1991; Hughes, 2013; Hancock, 2007.
88. Frances M. Beale, "Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female," in Toni Cade Bambara, ed., *The Black Woman: An Anthology* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1970), 90–100; Jennifer L. Berdahl and Celia Moore, "Workplace Harassment: Double Jeopardy for Minority Women," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 91 (March 2006), 426–36.
89. Benstead, Jamal, and Lust, 2015.
90. Ibid.
91. Tarek E. Masoud, *Counting Islam: Religion, Class and Elections in Egypt* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

APPENDIX

Appendix A

Table A1 shows the experimental design.

Table A1 Experimental Conditions and Question Wording for the Dependent Variable

Question stem	On a scale from 1 to 10, how likely would you be to vote in the future for [insert randomized statement here] where 1 means you would definitely not vote for and 10 means that you would definitely vote for this candidate: An educated:
Female	...woman.
Male tribal member	...man who is a member of your tribe.
Female tribal member	...woman who is a member of your tribe.
Male Islamist	...man who is a member of the IAF.
Female Islamist	...woman who is a member of the IAF.
Male	...man.

Table A2 shows the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Model 1), binary logistic regression (Model 2), as well as ordinal logistic regression (Model 4) for robustness checks. We determined that OLS is not an appropriate statistical model for our data however (see Appendix D for our reasoning). Collapsing the ten-point scale into a dichotomous measure of preference for candidates yields similar results to the ordinal logit regression analysis, thus, we interpret the results of the more streamlined binary model in the paper, but all results are robust to all three models. (See Appendix D for robustness checks).

Table A2 Determinants of Preference for Candidate Characteristics

	OLS ¹ 1	Binary Logit ¹ 2	Ordinal Logit ¹ 3
Male Tribal Member	0.637*** (0.165)	0.364** (0.115)	0.389** (0.116)
Female Tribal Member	0.101 (0.197)	0.184 (0.141)	0.0522 (0.148)
Male Islamist	-0.909*** (0.218)	-0.511*** (0.151)	-0.538*** (0.108)
Female Islamist	-0.573* (0.245)	-0.309* (0.151)	-0.346** (0.096)
Male	0.795*** (0.200)	0.549*** (0.140)	0.464** (0.126)
Gender of Respondent	-0.601*** (0.142)	-0.428*** (0.105)	-0.323** (0.093)
Age	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Socio-Economic Status 2	0.207 (0.151)	0.156 (0.094)	0.119 (0.091)
Socio-Economic Status 3	-0.032 (0.228)	0.104 (0.151)	-0.008 (0.105)
Constant	6.669***	0.531**	
Cut 1			-2.122***
Cut 2			-1.072***
Cut 3			-1.324***
Cut 4			-0.921***
Cut 5			-0.400**
Cut 6			-0.085
Cut 7			0.289
Cut 8			0.777***
Cut 9			1.216***
Observations	2,850	2,850	2,850

¹Female candidate is the base outcome. Standard errors in parentheses; †p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.²

Appendix B: Randomization

1,499 Jordanian respondents provided 3,376 candidate evaluations for this study. Table B1 shows that the six experimental conditions were randomly distributed across the districts (the primary sampling units, PSUs).

Table B1 Randomized Block Design: Assignment of Respondents to Experimental Conditions

	Female treatment	Male tribal member treatment	Female tribal member treatment	Male Islamist treatment	Female Islamist treatment	Male treatment	Total
Amman 1	47(8.4%)	49(8.6%)	36(6.9%)	35(6.7%)	51(8.5%)	49(8.2%)	267(7.9%)
Amman 4	51(9.1%)	53(9.3%)	52(10.0%)	52(10.0%)	49(8.2%)	49(8.2%)	306(9.0%)
Balqa 2	39(7.0%)	41(7.1%)	48(9.2%)	47(9.0%)	57(9.5%)	58(9.7%)	290(8.6%)
Zarqa 3	53(9.5%)	53(9.3%)	58(11.1%)	57(11.0%)	48(8.0%)	47(7.9%)	316(9.4%)
Irbid 1	42(7.5%)	43(7.5%)	52(10.0%)	52(10.0%)	48(8.0%)	49(8.2%)	286(8.5%)
Irbid 8	45(8.0%)	45(7.9%)	42(8.0%)	41(7.9%)	53(8.9%)	52(8.7%)	278(8.3%)
Jerash	51(9.1%)	52(9.1%)	39(7.5%)	41(7.9%)	47(7.9%)	46(7.7%)	276(8.2%)
Ajloun 2	52(9.3%)	53(9.3%)	33(6.3%)	32(6.2%)	54(9.0%)	54(9.0%)	278(8.3%)
Tafileh 1	47(8.4%)	47(8.2%)	47(9.0%)	48(9.3%)	54(9.0%)	57(9.5%)	300(8.9%)
Tafileh 2	34(6.0%)	37(6.5%)	33(6.3%)	33(6.4%)	50(8.4%)	49(8.2%)	236(7.0%)
Ma'an 2	52(9.3%)	52(9.1%)	36(6.9%)	36(6.9%)	42(7.0%)	44(7.4%)	262(7.8%)
Ma'an 3	46(8.2%)	46(8.0%)	45(8.6%)	45(8.7%)	45(7.5%)	45(7.5%)	272(8.0%)
Total	559(100%)	571(100%)	521(100%)	519(100%)	598(100%)	599(100%)	3,376(100%)

Two-tailed χ^2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across groups.

Table B2 shows that the conditions were randomly distributed across the independent variables, as shown by insignificant chi-square tests.

Table B2 Randomization of Treatment and Independent Variables

	Female treatment	Male tribal member treatment	Female tribal member treatment	Male Islamist treatment	Female Islamist treatment	Male treatment	Total
Respondent sex							
Female	254(50.9%)	260(50.9%)	236(50.9%)	237(51.2%)	271(51.2%)	272(51.3%)	1530(51.1%)
Male	245(49.1%)	251(49.1%)	228(49.1%)	226(48.8%)	258(48.8%)	258(48.7%)	1466(48.9%)
(<i>N</i> = 2996/ <i>Mean</i> = .51/ <i>Sd</i> = .50)							
$\chi^2(5) = .0423(p < .1000)$							
Islamist tendency ¹							
Not Islamist	182(41.2%)	184(40.7%)	166(42.4%)	165(42.4%)	187(40.0%)	188(40.2%)	1072(41.1%)
Islamist	260(58.8%)	268(59.3%)	226(57.6%)	224(57.6%)	280(60.0%)	280(59.8%)	1538(58.9%)
(<i>N</i> = 2610/ <i>Mean</i> = .51/ <i>Sd</i> = .50)							
$\chi^2(5) = .9419(p < .967)$							
Tribalist ²							
Not tribalist	123(33.9%)	127(34.4%)	105(29.0%)	103(28.7%)	135(34.0%)	135(33.9%)	728(32.4%)
Tribalist	240(66.1%)	242(65.6%)	257(71.0%)	256(71.3%)	262(66.0%)	263(66.1%)	1520(67.6%)
(<i>N</i> = 2248/ <i>Mean</i> = .51/ <i>Sd</i> = .50)							
$\chi^2(5) = 6.0981(p < .297)$							

Two-tailed χ^2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across administrative districts ($p < .941$).

¹Tribal favoritism: "On a scale of 1 to 10, how important is it to you that your tribe elects a representative to the parliament where a 1 is not at all important and a 10 is very important?"

²Islamist: "On a scale of 1 to 10, please state your personal preferences on the positions below...1 means you prefer a candidate or list without any Islamist tendency; 10 means you prefer a candidate or list with an Islamist tendency."

Appendix C: Survey Design

The Program on Governance and Local Development (www.gld.gu.se) 2014 Jordanian Post-Election Survey followed the country's 2013 parliamentary elections. Collaboration between the lead researchers on the project, Ellen Lust, Kristen Kao, and Lindsay Benstead, and an experienced and highly reputable local survey firm, Middle East Marketing Consultants lead by Tony Sabbagh, facilitated the translation of the questionnaire into the local Arabic dialect, creation of a complex sample design suitable for the needs of the study, recruitment and training of fifty enumerators and supervisors, and the swift and careful implementation of the survey in the field. Data collection was led by Kristen Kao and carried out from April 21, 2014 to April 28, 2014 employing tablet computers in face-to-face household interviews. The enumerators and supervisors were trained for three days prior to the implementation of the survey, after which they were sent out into the field in teams of five (four enumerators to each supervisor). Every attempt was made to have data uploaded to the main database in Amman every evening over Internet, and one of the authors analyzed the results each evening to check for errors or inconsistencies.

The purpose of the study was to assess political attitudes and behaviors following parliamentary elections in 2013 among the target population of Jordanian citizens of voting age (18 years) or older. To ensure sampling of adequate numbers of respondents eligible to vote in either multimember or single-member electoral districts as well as adequate representation of rural,¹ tribal populations under-counted in conventional probability-proportional-to-size sampling, a purposive multistage stratified sampling design was used with electoral district as the primary sampling unit. Jordan's 45 electoral districts served as strata. Twelve districts were selected, within which 25 households were randomly selected from blocks enumerated in the 2004 census.

Once in the field, interviewers were instructed to stratify selection of respondents to obtain approximately equal numbers of male and female respondents, and to select newer buildings in all replacement interviews in an attempt to gain representation of respondents who live in buildings constructed after the 2004 census. Kish tables were used to select one eligible individual within each household at random. Due to the sampling design, results are likely to show clustering in responses. Data analyses should take stratification variables into account and we do so by adding a `svyset` command to stratify by district and cluster responses at the neighborhood level.

Interviewers recorded detailed sampling and refusal information on coversheets completed for up to two visits to each residence. Incomplete surveys in the dataset are the result of a variety of issues. Refusals, in which either the person answering the door or the participant selected by the Kish table refused to participate, make up one

1. Defining the terms "rural" versus "urban" is a subjective process. Population density statistics at the electoral district level for Jordan were unobtainable, so two measures were constructed from available eligible voter data try to capture the differences between urban and rural electoral districts.

type of incomplete survey in the dataset. A survey in which the participant decided to stop participating halfway through the questionnaire constitutes another example of an incomplete interview. Towards the end of fielding, it became apparent that some of the surveys took 20 minutes or less for enumerators to complete. The researchers conducting the project and the local partner concluded that these surveys were too short to be considered to be realistic, thus part of the final two days of the survey was spent replacing these surveys.²


A response rate of 79.8% is based on a total of 1,879 residences visited and 1,499 completed interviews. Among these visits, 7.3% interviews are incomplete due to empty, closed, or non-residential units; ineligible respondents; or other reasons. Another 13.6% are incomplete because respondents refused to participate in the survey. Finally, 12% of the interviews were marked incomplete because they fell short of the 20-minute threshold established to verify that the interviewer did not rush through the interview, so as to call the validity of the interview into question.

2. If the interview took less than 20 minutes, it is marked as incomplete under the variable “complete”. Analyses of this dataset should be carried out keeping these issues in mind, dropping these surveys from analyses where appropriate.

Appendix D: Robustness Checks

We performed a number of robustness checks of the models presented in the paper. We find that an ordinary least squares regression analysis is inappropriate for this data as the likelihood of voting for each candidate is not normally distributed and we did not want to lose data by truncating this scale. (See Figure D1).

Figure D1 Likelihood of Voting for Candidate




To check for an alternative method of analyzing the data, an ordered logit was run on the data. In the sample as a whole, as shown in Table D2, according to ordinal logit analysis, the male candidate without additional identity information is the most electable, followed by the male tribal candidate, the female tribal candidate, the female candidate lacking an intersectional identity, and finally the female Islamist candidate does slightly better than the male Islamist. This is the same outcome as we found with binary logit regression analysis.

Table D2 Predicted Probability of Preference for Candidate (Ordered Logistic Analysis)

Candidate Type	Probability of 10 (%)	Probability of 1 (%)	Rank Ordinal Logit Analysis
Male	31	7	1
Male Tribal Member	30	8	2
Female Tribal Member	22	12	3
Female	22	10	4
Female Islamist	18	16	5
Male Islamist	15	19	6

If we use an ordinal logit regression analysis, we see in a visual presentation of the predicted probabilities of outcomes that male candidates, male tribe members, female tribe members, and female candidates all are statistically significantly more likely to receive a score of 10, the respondent would definitely vote for the candidate, than other categories (Figure D3). For the male Islamist candidate, the outcome of 1, the respondent would definitely not vote for the candidate, is most likely, whereas for the female an outcome of 1 is second likely.

Figure D3 Predicted Probability of Preference for the Candidate (Ordered Logistic Analysis)




According to OLS the male candidate with no other information does best and then the male tribal member, followed by female tribal member and then female lacking other an intersectional identity, then female Islamist, and finally male Islamist, as shown in Table D4. This ranking is the same as what a binary logistic regression analysis finds.

Table D4 OLS Analysis of the Experimental Results

Candidate Type	Point Estimate	Rank OLS
Male	7.12	1
Male Tribal Member	6.9	2
Female Tribal Member	6.4	3
Female	6.31	4
Female Islamist	5.7	5
Male Islamist	5.4	6


If we use an OLS regression analysis, we see in a visual presentation of the predicted probabilities of voting for the candidate (Figure D5) that is very similar to the basic model presented in Figure 1. in the paper. Male candidates lacking an additional identity do statistically significantly better than all other candidates with the exception of the male co-tribal member. However, while the male tribal member does statistically significantly better than the female candidate lacking an intersectional identity ($p < 0.000$), he is not significantly more preferred than a female tribal member. Thus, the results reported in the paper are robust to the use of OLS.

Figure D5 Predicted Probability of Preference for the Candidate (OLS).



In response to a concern that middling categories of preference for a co-tribal or Islamist candidate or list may be driving our results, we re-ran the analysis separating out this category of respondent. (Figure D6). We find that respondents with a strong tendency towards co-tribal favoritism (7-10 on a 10-point scale) are statistically significantly more likely to prefer tribal candidates than respondents who do not favor their co-tribal members. They are also just as likely to prefer female co-tribal candidates as they are to prefer male co-tribal candidates. Cutting this measure into three categories only strengthens our findings concerning intersectional identities.


Figure D6 Division of Preference for Tribalist into Three Categories



Note: Base comparison is a non-tribalist respondent who was a 1-4 on the 10 point scale of favoring tribal member candidates.

We also find that strongly Islamist respondents (7-10 on the 10-point scale) are statistically significantly more likely to prefer Islamist candidates than non-Islamists (1-4 on the 10-point scale). (Figure D7). They are also significantly as likely to prefer female Islamist candidates compared to male Islamist candidates compared to non-Islamist respondents. Thus, splitting the sample into three groups does not affect our findings concerning intersectional identities.


Figure D7 Division of Preference for Islamist into Three Categories



Note: Base comparison is a non-Islamist respondent who was a 1-4 on the 10 point scale of being pro-Islamist.

Finally, we checked the results for a gender divide and we find that female voters are significantly more likely to prefer female candidates of all backgrounds supporting SIT. (Figure D8). This finding differs from feminist voters only in that feminists dislike female Islamists to a significant degree supporting our conclusions that the intersectional identity of being Islamist and female leads to differential treatment among feminists which is different than the singular identity of being female versus male.

Figure D8 Marginal Effects of Respondent Gender Interacted with Candidate Statement



Note: Figure D8 shows the predicted probability of being a likely voter for a candidate for female respondents compared to the baseline of male respondents at 0 (95% confidence intervals).